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RUNAWAY SHOP: ENFORCED BARGAINING
AT A NEW LOCATION
INTRODUCTION
"Runaway shop" is the common term for the relocation of operations
by an employer without first bargaining with the statutory representative
of its employees,' or the relocation with the primary intent of escaping
this representative.2 This term applies to a relocation rather than an
actual termination of operations.'
The National Labor Relations Board has been dealing with the
"runaway" shop almost since the inception of the Board. While the
NLRA does not expressly condemn the "runaway" shop, the Board has
held that the relocation may constitute three separate unfair labor prac-
tices under section 8 of the Act.' First, it can constitute a violation of sec-
tion 8(a) (1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by section 7 [which among other things guarantees employees
the right to organize]." 6 Secondly, there can be a violation of 8(a) (3),
which states that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment . .. encourage[s] or discourage[s] membership
1. E.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 552-54 (1961), enforced sub nom.,
Philadelphia Dress Joint Board v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962); Industrial
Fabricating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 163-72 (1957), enforced sub nom., NLRB v.
Mackneish, Inc., 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937
(1939), modified by consent, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940); California Footwear Co.,
114 N.L.R.B. 765, 771 (1955), enforced it part sub nom., NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d
886 (9th Cir. 1957).
2. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 676 (1965), enforcement denied sub nom.,
Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.
1967). See NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962).
3. An employer may terminate his business "for any reason he pleases." Textile
Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965). See
Getman, Section 8 (a) (3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee
Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 735, 752-55 (1965). Determining the existence of
a relocation rather than a termination may require proof of the relationship between an
old business operation and a new one. See Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965)
California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955).
4. Schieber Millinery Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 937 (1939), modified by consent, 116 F.2d
281 (8th Cir. 1940).
5. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
158 (1964).
6. Id. at § 8 (a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1). New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B.
117 (1953); S. & K. Knee Pants Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937); J. Klotz & Co., 13
N.L.R.B. 746, 781 (1939).
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in any labor organization."7 This unfair labor practice attaches when
the relocation results in the discharge of employees.' Thirdly, a relocation
can constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) if the
employer "refuse[s] to bargain collectively with the representative of his
employees. . .. " This subsection prohibits the "secret move."1
Section 10(c) of the NLRA states that the Board, upon finding an
unfair labor practice,
shall issue . . .an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice [listed in section 8], and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement with or
without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
Under this section, the Board's usual action in "runaway" shop cases is
to order the employer to provide reinstatement, backpay, and travel and
moving expenses. 2
The Board's order is usually framed in the alternative, allowing the
employer to return to his old site or to remain at his new one.'" If the
employer chooses to return, he is required to offer reinstatement at the
old plant to his old employees.14 If he elects to remain at his new site,
7. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1964). See Winchester Electronics, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292
(1960) ; Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
8. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1960) ; Diaper Jean Mfg.
Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954). See Getrman, § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort
to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 735 (1952).
9. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964). See Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
For a discussion of labor violations of runaway shops see 77 HARV. L. REv. 1100 (1964).
10. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Brown Truck & Trailer
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
11. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1964) (Emphasis added).
12. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, 502 (1953) ; Industrial Fabricat-
ing, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957) ; J. Klotz & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 781 (1939);
Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 557 (1961).
13. E.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 557 (1961), enforced sub nom.,
Philadelphia Dress Joint Board v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Industrial
Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957), enforced sub nor., NLRB v. Mackneish,
272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959).
For a discussion of the reasons for the alternative remedy see Comment, 7 VILL.
L. REV. 450, 464-65 (1962).
The alternative remedy solution to the runaway shop has met dissent on the Board
on the ground that it allows the employer to enjoy the fruits of his unfair labor practice.
Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954).
14. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 771 (1955), enforced in part sub
norn., NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Tennessee-Carolina Transp.,
Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1373 (1954), enforcement denied per curiam, 226 F.2d 743
(6th Cir. 1955) ; Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, 502 (1953), enforcement
denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162,
172 (1957), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959). In
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 258 (1962), where the employer was held to
constitute a "single employer," the Board directed reinstatement at the employer's other
380 Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1968], Art. 8
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however, he must not only offer reinstatement, but must also pay his
employees' travel and moving expenses." If the reinstatement at the new
site is accepted by the old employees (discriminatees), the workers at the
new site (replacements) may be discharged to make room for the old
employees.' If insufficient work is available at the new site, the old
employees not reinstated will usually be placed on a preferential hiring
list. 7
Backpay orders are almost invariably attached to reinstatement
orders.'" The backpay that is awarded can cover the period from the time
of the illegal shutdown until 1) the employee is offered reinstatement at
the old site,'" 2) he accepts reinstatement at the new one,"0 3) the
employee is put on a preferential hiring list," or 4) he obtains sub-
stantially equivalent employment." The backpay award is reduced by the
actual earnings of the employee 3 or by the amount that he could have
earned 4 during the indicated period.
An additional remedy applied by the Board in some situations is an
order to bargain with the old union at the new location." The enforced
mills, if the Darlington mill was not reopened. But the Board did not order the employees
at the other mills to be discharged if necessary to insure the discriminatees of getting jobs.
15. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, 502 (1953), enforcement denied,
211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172
(1957), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. Machneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959) ; J. Klotz
& Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 781 (1939) ; Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 557 (1961),
enforced sub nom., Philadelphia Dress Joint Board v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.
1962).
16. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, 502 (1953) ; Industrial Fabricat-
ing, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957). In Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 n.6
(1965) the Board stated: "The standard 8 (a) (3) remedy requires discharge of replace-
ments if necessary to reinstate discriminatees."
17. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 772 (1955) ; Tennessee-Carolina
Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1373 (1954) ; Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B.
162, 172 (1957) ; Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962), enforced,
316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). In Williams Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 715 (1941), however,
the dissent maintained that to be placed on a preferential hiring list is really no remedy
at all-not a return to the status quo, because the employee "might be on that list
forever." Id. at 738.
18. In a few cases, reinstatement alone has been the remedy, but this has been
applied only when the employer's new location is in the same area as the old. Omaha
Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 878, 894 (1938) ; Robinson & Golluber, 2 N.L.R.B. 460, 470
(1936).
19. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, 502 (1953) ; Industrial Fabricat-
ing, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957) ; California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 772
(1955) ; Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1373 (1954).
20. Id.
21. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B 1022, 1029 (1962); Industrial
Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957).
22. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 255 (1962) ; Sidele Fashions, Inc.,
133 N.L.R.B. 547, 557 (1961).
23. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 555 (1961) ; California Footwear Co.,
114 N.L.R.B. 765, 807 (1955).
24. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941).
25. See notes 81 & 82 infra and accompanying text.
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bargaining remedy is designed to restore the collective bargaining rela-
tionship established by the employees at the old site.
In 1965, in a decision concerning the relocation of the Garwin
Corporation, 6 the Board ordered the relocated alter ego of Garwin 7
to bargain with its old union at the new site,2" regardless of that union's
majority or minority status at the new site.2" The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia denied enforcement of this order."
This note considers the remedy of enforced bargaining at the new
site and its status after the Garwin decisions.
BOARD'S AUTHORITY TO FRAME REMEDIES
The NLRA directs the Board "to take such affirmative action.., as
will effectuate the policies of this Act."" On its face this directive
appears to give the Board wide discretion in the framing of remedies.
The Supreme Court held recently in Fibreboard Corporation v. NLRB"
that it would not disturb a board order "unless it can be shown that
the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can
fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." "
The courts have not given a literal interpretation to the statutory
directive of section 10(c). "4 They have interpreted the Board's authority
as confined to the framing of remedies that are remedial and not punitive
in nature." In 1938, Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB con-
tained what may be the first use by the courts of this remedial-punitive
test as a criterion upon which to grant or deny enforcement to a Board
order." The Supreme Court there stated:
We think that this authority to order affirmative action does
not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the
Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose
because he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the
Board may be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might
be effectuated by such an order.
26. 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965).
27. The relocated Garwin was operating in Florida under the name of S'Agaro,
Inc. Id.
28. Id. at 666.
29. Id.
30. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
31. National Labor Relations Act § 10 (c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160
(c) (1964).
32. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
33. Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
34. Comment, Labor Law, 7 VILL. L. REv. 450, 465 (1962).
35. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
36. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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The power to command affirmative action is remedial not
punitive, and is to be exercised in aid of the Board's authority
to restrain violation and as a means of removing or avoiding the
consequences of violation where those consequences are of a
kind to thwart the purposes of the Act. 7
The remedial-punitive distinction has met some criticism. One cri-
ticism is that the purpose of the distinction is to provide a "peg" for the
reviewing court's decision. 8 The courts may be employing the doctrine
to create a test of reasonableness for the Board's orders, 9 rather than
limiting their determination to whether the order effectuates the policies
of the Act as defined in section L" Moreover, determining what is
"remedial" and what is "punitive" may be merely a matter of semantics."
ARGUMENT FOR THE USE OF THE REMEDY
Various arguments may be advanced supporting the validity of the
remedy of enforced bargaining at the new site. One such argument is
that it completes the Board's attempt to restore conditions to the status
quo ante-those existing before the commission of the unfair labor
practice. The orders of reinstatement, backpay, and travel and moving
expenses all endeavor to put the injured employees in the position they
would have been in, absent the employer's unfair labor practice."2
The order to bargain furthers this restoration by reinstating the bar-
gaining relationship established prior to the unfair labor practice. Admit-
tedly, in "runaway" shop cases the policy of complete restoration of the
status quo would seem to require a direct return order. The Board,
although claiming that it is within its authority to order a "runaway"
37. Id. at 235.
38. 89 U. PA. L. RE v. 648, 655 (1941).
39. Comment, Labor Law, 7 VILL. L. REV. 450, 465 (1962) ; 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep.
3795 (1961).
40. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of employment ....
41. In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953), the Court stated:
It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the policies of the
Act. We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering into the bog
of logomachy, as we are invited to by debate about what is "remedial" and
what is "punitive." It seems more profitable to stick closely to the direction of
the Act by considering what order does . . . and what order does not, bear
appropriate relation to the policies of the Act.
42. Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 385 (1938), modified, 311 U.S. 7 (1940);
J. Klotz & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 778 (1939); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937,
966 (1940).
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employer to return to its old site, 3 has sought to remedy illicit relocations
without resorting to this order." If the Board may order the employer
to return, an order requiring that the employer bargain with the very
union it was trying to escape would seem to offer the next best alter-
native. In fact, as an attempted restoration, enforced bargaining at the
new site is less adverse to the employer's interests than an order to
return. 5
While the order to bargain is usually not applied where it is assumed
that no employees will relocate," the Board in Garwin argued that the
order would serve the policies of the Act regardless of the number of
employees actually relocated.4 7 Because of the economic and geographic
circumstances in Garwin, the standard remedies of reinstatement, back-
pay, and travel and moving expenses would have little impact on the
employer, and would allow him to benefit from his unfair labor practice.
As stated by the dissent in the Court of Appeals review of the Garwin
case:
In the present case, the Board reexamined its policy and found
it inadequate, at least in relation to an employer whose purpose
to throw off its union obligations coincided with economic and
geographic circumstances which minimized the penalty to be
anticipated under the Board's usual approach. Because those
measures would permit Garwin to retain the fruits of its unfair
labor practices at slight cost, the Board determined to take
additional steps to remedy the deliberate evasion of the statutory
responsibilities portrayed by this record. 8
The New York employees of Garwin were women who had family ties
in New York and who could not feasibly accept reinstatement. 9 Refusing
43. J. Klotz & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 778 (1939) (dictum).
44. 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. % 3795.50 (1961). Arbitrators, however, have ordered
runaway employers to return and the courts have upheld the orders. 34 Lab. Arb. 771,
affirmed, 34 Lab. Arb. 876 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). In 1936 a New York court ordered a
runaway employer to return on the basis of a contract provision stating that "removal
of factories beyond the 5-cent fare carrier limit was forbidden." This move was from
New York to Pennsylvania. Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y.S.
898 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
45. See Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 (1965).
The union in Garwin appealed the Board's decision because the Board had not
ordered Garwin to return. Local 57 International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB,
374 F.2d 295, 300 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
46. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 682 (1965). The Trial Examiner would not
recommend the compulsory bargaining order because he felt bound by the fact that the
Board sad not previously, under similar circumstances, made such an order.
47. Id. at 666.
48. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
307 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
49. Id. at 305.
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol2/iss2/8
R UNA WAY SHOP
reinstatement would necessarily preclude their incurring any travel and
moving expenses. The tight labor market in New York would minimize
any backpay liability that would attach to Garwin. °
The dissents in other Board decisions have decried the inadequacy
of a remedy that allows an employer to enjoy the fruits of its unfair labor
practices with relative ease." In these cases the employers had closed
departments in their businesses and moved the departments in an effort
to thwart attempts at unionization.52 The dissents, pointing out that the
"effectuation of the policies of the Act is achieved by restoration in so far
as possible of the status quo existing before the commission of the unfair
labor practices,"5 advocated the issuance of an order requiring the
employers to reopen their closed departments and reinstate the discharged
employees. 4 Failure to adopt this form of remedy, it was contended,
permitted the employer to enjoy the fruits of his unfair labor practices.5"
The order to bargain could force an unwanted union upon the
employees in the new location. However, it might not be harsh to impose
a bargaining agent on employees who owe the existence of their jobs to
the unfair labor practice of the employer. 6 The Board in Garwin
maintained that the rights of the newly hired employees in Florida to
choose or not to choose their own bargaining representative "must yield
to the statutory objective of fashioning a meaningful remedy to the
unfair labor practices found." '
The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals decision in the Garwzin
case bolstered his argument for imposition of a bargaining agent on the
new employees by an analogy to single location cases in which the union
loses its majority after employer unfair labor practices. The dissent stated
that it "is clear that an absence of majority status will not always defeat
an order to bargain."5 5 In Franks Brothers v. NLRB," the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that an order requiring an employer to
bargain with a minority union is an improper remedy, because it does not
take into account the desires of the majority of employees who do not
50. Id.
51. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1374 (1954) ; Williams
Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 715, 738 (1941) ;SchieberMillinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
52. Id.
53. Williams Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 715, 738 (1940).
54. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1374 (1954) ; Williams
Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 715, 738 (1941) ; Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
55. Id.
56. 16 CATE[. U. L. REv. 474, 478 (1967).
57. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 (1965).
58. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
306 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The dissent cities nine cases.
59. 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944). Sections 9(c)(3) and 9(e)(2) of the Labor
Management Relations Act state that no election shall 'be held in a bargaining unit
within a twelve month period following a valid election.
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want to be represented by that union. NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corpora-
tion"0 justified the use of this remedy as an attempt to "foster stability
in collective bargaining relations by requiring the employer to deal with
the union." Although distinguishing the criterion as inapplicable to the
present situation, the court in Garwin stated the basis of such com-
pulsory bargaining orders:
Underlying the Board's compulsory bargaining orders is an
eminently reasonable principle: those workers who have voted
for a representative should not have their choice cancelled out
by an employer's unfair labor practice. If a union loses its
majority because some workers were coerced or because the
company wrongfully refused to bargain with it, restoration of
the status quo calls for the Board's recognition of the Union. 1
Since the Board may refuse to recognize the statutory rights of the
majority of workers to choose their own bargaining representative in the
interest of "stability in collective bargaining relations,"6 it seems valid
to assert that this "stability" also needs to be served in the Garwin
"runaway" shop situation. In the words of the Garwin majority: the
''union [lost] its majority . . . because the company wrongfully refused
to bargain with it, [therefore] restoration of the status quo calls for
Board recognition of the Union."63
The "runaway" shop situation presents conflicting policies: the
exercise of free choice by the new employees and the preservation of the
existing collective bargaining relationship. Arguably, the Board should
have the latitude to accommodate one policy to another."
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF THE REMEDY
The Court of Appeals maintained that it was of paramount import-
ance whether the necessity of removing from the employer the benefits
of his wrongdoing
standing alone and without relationship to redressing grievances
of the New York workers, who suffered the violation of their
statutory rights, is enough to justify infringing fundamental
rights of comparable magnitude vested by law in the Florida
60. 312 F.2d 610, 616 (1st Cir. 1963).
61. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 301
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
62. NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 616 (1st Cir. 1963).
63. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
301 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
64. See Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
307 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
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workers.85
The court held that once it is determined that the New York workers
will not move to Florida, the Board can no longer contend that, in framing
this order, it is balancing their rights against those of the Florida
workers. 8 "[A]t this point the New York workers are out of the
picture, and denial of the basic rights of the Florida workers simply does
not effectuate the policies of the Act."87 In answer to the dissenting
opinion which endorsed the order,"8 the majority insisted "on a proper
balancing of rights."8 " The dissent, it maintained, failed to note that
"restoration of the status quo" means redress to injured employees and
not punishment of employers.7"
This majority position emphasizes the framework within which the
courts have held that the Board must operate. The Garwin majority cited
Republic Steel Corporation v. NLRB for the proposition that "deterrence
alone is not a proper basis for a remedy."'" The court stated that "it has
been established . . . that the purpose of Board remedies is to rectify the
harm done the injured workers, not to provide punitive measures against
errant employers. )72
If deterrence were a valid basis for a Board order, the enforced
bargaining order fails even to achieve that objective. Depending on the
circumstances at the new site, the compulsory bargaining order could have
various effects. If the union is not strong enough in the new location to
obtain a majority status in one year, then the order is of no real value
since the employer is able eventually to obtain an unorganized shop. If the
union is strong in the new area and would be able to establish a majority
at the very outset, then the order is seemingly unnecessary. The order will
have an effect only in those situations in which the union will be able to
obtain majority support within the one year period.7 8
It seems unlikely, however, that an employer, motivated by animosity
toward the union or an unwillingness to bargain with the union, will
relocate his plant in an area in which the very organizations that he is
65. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 302
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 304.
69. Id. at 303.
70. Id.
71. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303
(D.C. Cir. 1967), citing Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940).
One writer maintains that the Board may fashion a remedy solely for its deterrent
value. He contends that contrary implications of Republic Steel were "dispelled by
Phelps v. Dodge." 18 STAN. L. REv. 937, 942 (1966).
72. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
73. 18 STAN. L. REv. 937, 942-43 (1966).
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trying to escape are strong and accepted by the people of the locality. The
employer will in all likelihood relocate in an area in which unions are met
with hostility.7" Mr. Benjamin Wyle, General Counsel of the Textile
Workers' Union of America, AFL-CIO, referred to these areas of
hostility toward unions in 1961 while testifying before the Subcommittee
on the National Labor Relations Board:
I raise the question with you in light of this new phenomenon
which did not exist in the thirties and forties, of small com-
munities in various parts of the country seeking to pirate
industries away from other regions of the country and attempt-
ing to do so with all kinds of attractive propositions and offers,
including the offer to keep unions out.... ."
If the employer has moved into an area, similar to that described above,
in all probability the union would not be able to establish a majority
prior to the expiration of the one-year compulsory bargaining period, and
the employer would have the non-union shop he desired.
Not only will the compulsory bargaining order have little effect on
the employer's position, it may have a detrimental effect upon the "full
flow of commerce" referred to by section 1 of the Act."6 A genuine threat
to industrial peace is created by the attempt to force the employees to
accept a bargaining agent with which they are not in sympathy and
against which they may even be said to be hostile. In seeking to enforce
its demands through the accepted medium of a strike, the union may find
that it has no supporters. If the workers are not in sympathy with the
union, they surely would not strike to help it obtain its goals. This would,
in all likelihood, bring on conflicts and increase hostilities.
Another possible consequence of an order requiring the employer to
bargain with a union that does not represent a majority of the workers is
that the order might adversely affect the chances of the union to ultim-
ately gain majority support within a similar one-year period.
In Garwin the Board assumed that none of the original employees
would relocate."8 This assumption seems to distinguish the basis for
the argument that "absence of majority status will not always defeat an
74. The South, the primary area of relocations offers additional inducements such
as tax concessions and low plant site rentals. 7 VILL. L. Rev. 450, 451 (1962).
The biggest inducement, however, is the union hostility: "Unions are opposed by
the pulpit, press and public." Id.
75. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 271 (1961).
76. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
77. 18 STAN. L. REv. 937, 943 (1966).
78. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 (1965).
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order to bargain.""9 As stated by the Court of Appeals in Garwin, the
rationale underlying the single location cases that require bargaining in
the absence of majority status is that the
interest being protected is the freedom of choice of the workers
in a bargaining unit. The compulsory bargaining order is in-
tended to put into effect what these workers had voted. Even
when the majority of the plant vote against the union after an
unfair labor practice and the swing votes are cast by new
workers, a substantial number of workers still in the unit had
opted for the union when free to do so. 80
STATUS OF THE REMEDY AFTER GARWIN
The Short Move
The remedy at issue is not entirely new: the Board has
applied it to "runaways" where the move was of such a short
distance that the Board could assume that, absent the unfair
labor practices, workers would have followed the employer to
the new site.8 '
Prior to the Garwin decision, the Board relied upon the distance of
the move in determining whether the union would be required to establish
a majority at the new site before the employer would be required to bar-
gain." If the distance between the old and the new site was not great, the
Board "would order the employer to bargain with the union as the
representative of the same unit of his employees at the new plant, without
further proof of the union's representative status there."8 If there was a
considerable distance between the two plants, the Board, in an effort to
"accomodate the remedy to the realities of the situation,"8 " conditioned its
bargaining order on proof of the union's majority status at the new site. 5
The Garwin court pointed out that the Board's limiting the applica-
tion of the enforced bargaining to short distance relocations had met with
79. See text accompanying notes 58-61 s.upra.
80. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
301 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
81. Id. at 303.
82. Id.
83. Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957), enforced per curiam sub
nom., NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959); Brown Truck and Trailer
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 1016 (1953); Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480
(1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Rome Products Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948) ; New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117, 124 (1953), modified,
215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954).
84. Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 174 (1957).
85. Id.
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divided judicial response.8 6 In NLRB v. Lewis,7 the employer had
moved its operations a distance of twelve miles."8 The court enforced the
Board's order requiring the employer to bargain with the old union at
the new site. It asserted that it was a fair assumption that under a Board
reinstatement order most of the old employees would follow the employer
to its new site.88 But in NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Incorporated,"0
another "short-move" case, the court held that such an order "is not
proper inasmuch as Union does not appear to represent any of the em-
ployees in the [new] plant."
In the Garwin appeal the Board attempted to distinguish Rapid
Bindery on the grounds that there was no evidence of anti-union
motivation in that case.9 1 The Court of Appeals did not accept this
criterion of motivation as "a valid basis for an order."92 The court held
the two cases to, be conflicting and accepted the Rapid Bindery position."3
Application of Garzvin To All Situations
The regularly issued remedies (reinstatement, backpay, travel and
moving expenses) are inconsequential in the context of the Garwin
"runaway" shop." In the Garwin situation the "economic and geo-
graphic circumstances . . . [minimize] the penalty to be anticipated under
the Board's usual approach."95 However, the ineffectiveness of other
remedies should have no bearing on the acceptability of this remedy. The
remedy of enforced bargaining at the new site should rise or fall on its
own internal validity.
The approach of the Court of Appeals in Garzvin presents arguments
for a reevaluation of the remedy of enforced bargaining in "runaway"
shop stituations. The Garwin court emphasized that the Board should be
concerned with remedying the infringed rights of the old site employees
86. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
87. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), enforced in part sub nom.,
NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
88. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1957).
89. Id.
90. Rapid Bindery, Inc. v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 1961).
91. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295,
303 ( D.C.Cir. 1967).
92. Id.
93. Id. A footnote to the Lewis court's enforcement of the Board order stated that
since the alter ego of California Footwear had disassociated itself from the company, the
Board would impose no further duty to bargain with the local union, unless the two
became associated again. This seems to raise the question of whether this case is good
authority for the proposition of enforced bargaining at the new site, even in the short
move situation. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886, 887 n.2 (9th Cir. 1957).
94. See notes 41-53 supra and accompanying text.
95. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 305
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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and not with the prevention of future relocations."' The reexamination
of the Board's policy of ordering enforced bargaining should be under-
taken with this criteria in mind.
The main inquiry in Garwin of whether, without a prior determina-
tion of the number of old employees who will accept reinstatement and
relocate, it "is enough to justify infringing fundamental rights vested by
law in ... workers [at the new site]"" does not become meaningless just
because the move involves a relatively short distance. The Board istelf
has failed to develop a definable criteria for distinguishing a "short"
move from a "long" move. In Rome Products Company,"8 where the
move was 110 miles, the Board ordered compulsory bargaining at the
new site without a determination of the union's majority status. In
Industrial Fabricating, Incorporated,9 where the move was 100 miles,
the Board held that proof of majority status at the new site was a
prerequisite to union recognition. In Brown Truck and Trailer Manu-
facturing Company,' the Board refused to assume that the employees
would have relocated with the employer even though the move involved
30 miles of open road. In the Lewis case, the Board assumed that the
employees would move 12 miles across downtown Los Angeles.'
As presently constituted, the short move assumption could operate
unfairly. For example, in the case of a short move in which the presump-
tion is indulged that a majority of workers will relocate, no employees
may in fact relocate." 2 The new employees at the new site would then be
burdened with an unwanted union. Such a situation would represent a
failure to observe the balancing of the rights of employees made para-
mount by the Garwin court.' Conversely, in a longer move,", up to 50
per cent of the old employees could in fact relocate, yet be denied rep-
resentation of their union.'
Proposed Solution
The "balancing of rights" approach necessitates the existence of two
96. Id. at 303.
97. Id. at 302.
98. 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
99. 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957).
100. 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
101. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955).
102. See California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955). Here the "runaway"
relocated a distance of 12 miles.
103. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
104. E.g., the 30 mile move in Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B.
999 (1953).
105. There would be no incentive for the old employees to relocate until after the
Board has ordered the "runaway" employer to offer his old employees reinstatement,
backpay, and travel and moving expenses.
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conflicting interests. In the "runaway" shop situation as it existed in
Garwin, there is only one interest, that of the newly hired workers in
Florida. In its decision the Board assumed that none of the old employees
in New York would relocate."0 6 In order to conform its procedure to
the Garwin court's decision, the Board could require the union to make a
showing of the number of employees willing to relocate. This should
represent no great burden on the union. The union would merely be
required to consult its members in the old area. The employer could then
attempt to rebut this proof by evidence that the old employees have not
and will not relocate. The employer does not want the union and he there-
fore has an interest in protecting the rights of the new employees. The
court in Garwin states that the fact that the employer is asserting the
rights of the new employees does not divest that assertion of its
validity.'"
With this number as a basis of determination, the Board is then
in a position to "weigh" the competing interests and to decide whether the
number of employees willing to relocate is "substantial" enough to
justify the imposition of the enforced bargaining order. In this context,
it should be noted that the Garwin court stated that
Were the Board engaging in a genuine balancing of rights
of newly hired workers against those of discriminatees whose
places they took, we would allow it very wide scope.'
By having obtained this information undertaken this "balancing
of rights," the Board more nearly operates within the Garwin court's
outline of permissible authority." 9 This approach might have the effect
of restoring the validity of the compulsory bargaining order employed by
the Board to require "an employer to bargain with an established union
which loses its majority because of the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices."1 ' No requirement of majority status at the new site is necessary
because "a substantial number of the workers still in the unit had opted
for the union when free to do so .... 111
This result finds authority in Franks Brothers Company v.
NLRB."12 There the Supreme Court in enforcing a compulsory bar-
gaining order stated:
106. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 (1965).
107. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 302
n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
108. Id. at 302.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 301.
111. Id.
112. 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
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as the remedy here in question recognizes, a bargaining relation-
ship once rightfully established must be permitted to exist and
function for reasonable period in which it can be given a fair
chance to succeed."'
If the Board determines that a substantial number of old employees
would relocate, the rationale stated above would apparently directly
apply-regardless of the fact that the bargaining unit has relocated."'
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted, that the Board must reevaluate its
procedures and doctrines in relation to the "runaway" shop. The Garwin
court decision delineates the areas in which the Board can operate. By
attempting to operate within these bounds, the Board can adopt a reme-
dial policy that will accomodate the remedy to the realities of the situation.
113. Id. at 705.
114. See 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 267 (1965).
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